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Abstract
Background: Strengthened national health systems are necessary for effective and sustained expansion of
antiretroviral therapy (ART). ART and its supply chain management in Uganda are largely based on parallel and
externally supported efforts. The question arises whether systems are being strengthened to sustain access to ART.
This study applies systems thinking to assess supply chain management, the role of external support and whether
investments create the needed synergies to strengthen health systems.
Methods: This study uses the WHO health systems framework and examines the issues of governance, financing,
information, human resources and service delivery in relation to supply chain management of medicines and the
technologies. It looks at links and causal chains between supply chain management for ART and the national
supply system for essential drugs. It combines data from the literature and key informant interviews with
observations at health service delivery level in a study district.
Results: Current drug supply chain management in Uganda is characterized by parallel processes and information
systems that result in poor quality and inefficiencies. Less than expected health system performance, stock outs
and other shortages affect ART and primary care in general. Poor performance of supply chain management is
amplified by weak conditions at all levels of the health system, including the areas of financing, governance,
human resources and information. Governance issues include the lack to follow up initial policy intentions and a
focus on narrow, short-term approaches.
Conclusion: The opportunity and need to use ART investments for an essential supply chain management and
strengthened health system has not been exploited. By applying a systems perspective this work indicates the
seriousness of missing system prerequisites. The findings suggest that root causes and capacities across the system
have to be addressed synergistically to enable systems that can match and accommodate investments in disease-
specific interventions. The multiplicity and complexity of existing challenges require a long-term and systems
perspective essentially in contrast to the current short term and program-specific nature of external assistance.
Background
The scaling up of antiretroviral therapy (ART) in Uganda
gathered momentum with three major global health
initiatives (GHIs): the Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Program
(MAP) in 2002; the United States President’s Emergency
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Global Fund to
Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) in
2004. Free antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) have been
provided in the public governmental since 2003, when
the first national ART strategy and treatment guidelines
were developed [1-3]. Figure 1 illustrates the main events
in Uganda as they concern the expansion of ART.
By the end of 2009, 200,400 people were receiving
antiretroviral therapy and coverage of those in need
based on the new 2010 World Health Organisation
(WHO) thresholds had reached 39% [4]. In terms of
numbers the country has consequently come relatively
close to its targets of 240,000 and 342,200 people on
treatment by 2012 and 2020. However 95% of that
national response to ART is currently covered by donor
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funds [5]. Uganda, as it is estimated for other low-
income countries, will continue to depend largely on
external support for its disease-specific programs [6-8].
Given that ART and its supply chain management in
Uganda are today mainly based on parallel and exter-
nally supported efforts, the question arises for how to
sustain these once government is required to take over.
Uganda is starting to face that reality in the transition of
PEPFAR from the Bush to the Obama administration
and plans [9]. Sustained access to ART will essentially
depend on the strength of health systems. Looking at
some core indicators, the country’s skilled birth-atten-
dance rate is 42%, its measles immunization rate for 1-
year-old children is 68% and malaria-treatment access
within 24 hours of fever for children under 5 is 35.7%
[10,11]. As is the case in other low-income countries,
supply chain management is an especially weak part of
the national health system. The essential drug program
lacks more than 50% of the funding it would need for
the constant supply of the minimum care package [12].
Only 27% of hospitals and about 40% of other health
facilities report receiving the requested quantities of
essential drugs ordered through the National Medical
Store (NMS) [13]. Likewise and despite its relatively
high external support antiretroviral drug supply experi-
ences both over and undersupply [14]. Weak health sys-
tems appear to constrain absorption of external funding.
Only 26% of a Global Fund grant in Uganda had been
spent after twenty months [15,16].
Extensive literature reviews have summarized findings
about the effects of GHIs on health systems [17-19].
Research has, however, focused on single effects and
paid little attention to the interactions among health
system building blocks and interventions or the role of
contextual and governance issues [20-24]. Systems
thinking is a key approach to illuminate what works, in
what way and for whom, in a given context. It also
serves to explore the range of effects and potential
synergies, causal chains and linkages between complex
interventions such as ART and health systems [20].
To address these issues, we apply systems thinking to
the case of supply chain management for ART in Uganda.
We use the WHO health systems framework and examine
dimensions of governance, financing, information, human
resources and service delivery in relation to supply chain
management for ARVs and essential drugs. This paper
takes the viewpoint of a close examination of conse-
quences at district levels, and traces their causes within
the governance and other building blocks of health
systems.
Methods
This work uses findings from document and literature
review, health facility surveys, and key-informant inter-
views at district and national levels. A literature review
was conducted covering both peer-reviewed and grey lit-
erature, including the media. Sources included PubMed,
Web of Science, Eldis, Google and Google Scholar. Grey
Figure 1 Major events during antiretroviral scale-up in Uganda.
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literature such as audit reports, evaluations and tracking
studies were a main source of information. National
level assessments were based on principles of Grounded
Theory implying that the process of data collection and
emerging findings continuously shape research
approaches [25-27]. A first question guide focused on
information gaps which resulted from the review.
National partners performed key-informant interviews,
based on a few guiding questions which allowed respon-
dents to flexibly raise new issues and hypotheses. To
ensure consistency of interpretation, interviews were
conducted by the investigators themselves. Responses
were validated in subsequent interviews with other
stakeholders. We triangulated the different sources for
validation by following up findings from the literature
review and within interviews and relating findings at dis-
trict and facility level with views from national
stakeholders.
Observations at health service delivery level took place
in Iganga District in the Eastern Region of Uganda. The
study site Iganga was chosen as it is also the study site
of a larger research project studying the effects of anti-
retroviral treatment on maternal and child health.
Iganga is one of 95 districts in Uganda and it covers a
mainly rural area with a population of around 650,000
out of the national population of 32.4 million [28]. Four
health centres (HCs) at level IV and III and one district
hospital provide ART services. HC-IVs are structurally
small clinics with 1-2 clinicians, an obstetric theatre and
laboratories. HC-IIIs also provide some laboratory ser-
vices. The district hospital started to provide ART in
2005 followed by gradual provision through HCs in
2006 and 2007. By September 2009 a total of 1,171 peo-
ple in the district had been started on antiretroviral
drugs (ARVs). To evaluate the performance of ART at
the service-delivery level in Iganga District, two onsite
surveys were conducted at all ART-providing HCs in
June 2008 and September 2009. They included a com-
plete document review of registers, logbooks, drug
stocks, patient files and observed practices, and staff and
patient interviews in 72 health facilities. Semi-structured
interviews were conducted with 17 health staff and 273
patients. The detailed results will be published in a sepa-
rate paper currently in process.
Results
Supply management systems
Essential drug supply in Uganda uses a mixed “push”
and “pull” system. Upper-level health facilities order
drugs based on estimated need forecasts and a resource
envelope. Lower-level health facilities receive a fixed set
of drugs. The essential drug list includes 96 drugs for
districts to order from the National Medical Store
(NMS), which processes almost 1,000 individual orders
per month. When ART started, supply chain manage-
ment systems for essential drugs had just started to be
built to reach national coverage through a pull system.
Drug delivery to districts can take about double the
time foreseen [29]. One of the bottlenecks was that the
NMS only delivered to district headquarters. Since 2009
the NMS also delivers to HC IV and III level [30].
Faith-based and non-governmental organizations (FBOs
and NGOs) which account for 20-30% of the health
facilities in Uganda are served through a cash-and-carry
system of the Joint Medical Store (JMS). The NMS pro-
cures and manages an increasing number of ARV drugs
and supplies, 46 different ARV drugs and drug combina-
tions were registered in 2003 [31]. ARV procurement
and supply runs through standard NMS processes such
as the bimonthly essential drug delivery as well as on
parallel processes specifically set up for ARVs. The latter
generally works better due to more funding and smaller
volumes [32].
At Iganga District ARV shortages affected all ART-
providing facilities with considerable fluctuations regard-
ing capacities to take up new patients as illustrated in
Figure 2. ARVs were available at 83%, diagnostic kits at
70% and paediatric ARVs at less than half of the health
facilities surveyed. Stock-outs also occurred for antibio-
tics, including amoxicillin and cotrimoxazole dispensed
as prophylaxis for opportunistic infections in HIV-posi-
tive patients. Effects included problems in patient fol-
low-up and in the provision of ART. Patients were
advised to buy missing drugs in private pharmacies.
Switches to more complex and different drug regimens
were frequent to avoid treatment interruptions. Strate-
gies to cope with stock-outs included lending and bor-
rowing among facilities, duo-therapy, late initiation of
ART for new patients and treatment interruption. ARV
regimens from ten different manufacturers were found.
Health workers reported insufficient knowledge regard-
ing safe drug substitution and a general lack of guidance
to deal with shortages of ARVs. They faced difficulties
in forecasting needs given the lack of data. District med-
ical officers (DMO) were bypassed as facilities commu-
nicated directly with the NMS. Lack of feedback from
the NMS on placed orders further reduced their capa-
city to address potential bottlenecks.
National level surveys substantiate that provision of
ARVs suffers from both over and undersupply. Accord-
ing to findings from 2007 only a quarter of facilities
receive ARVs on a monthly basis, which is the required
frequency for consumption reporting [33]. At the same
time USD 0.5 million of ARVs are reported to have
expired in 2005 [34]. In 2008 the estimated expired
value was in the range of USD 1.3 - 2 million [35]. 58%
of government facilities reported holding expired ARVs,
compared to 29% of NGO facilities [33]. Test kits,
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prophylactic treatment and paediatric ARVs are espe-
cially affected by short supply. According to a health
facility survey in 2005 fewer than 25% of facilities were
maintaining adequate stock levels on nevirapine, HIV
test kits, and antibiotics to treat opportunistic infections
(OI) and sexually transmitted infections (STIs) [34].
Health facilities on average reported 1 month of stock-
outs of testing kits per year in 2005 [14]. Undersupply
of test kits was mainly caused by unexpected supply dis-
ruptions from two donors and resulted in rationing with
a focus on preventing mother-to-child transmission
(PMTCT) clients instead of the general population.
Findings from 2008 suggest that some facilities faced
shortages over several months. Only about 15% of
patients in need could be tested as a consequence [36].
A 2004 national laboratory assessment indicated that
due to a lack of reagents, half of the regional hospitals
could not perform confirmatory diagnostics for OI and
20-30% of district hospitals could not perform basic STI
and OI diagnostic tests [37].
For essential drugs, despite a four-fold increase in the
value of drugs distributed, less than half the money
needed for the basic minimum care package is available.
This means that most drugs will always be stocked out
because of insufficient funds as opposed to supply chain
problems [12]. Only 27% of hospitals and about 40% of
other facilities reported receiving the quantities of essen-
tial drugs they ordered through the NMS [13]. Improve-
ments in some areas exist such as an increase of
available drugs for STIs from 8% in 2002 to 24% in
2006 [34].
Figure 3 shows the number of largely externally sup-
ported systems to supply ARVs. It illustrates procurement,
storage and distribution systems for ARVs in the country
with nine different lines of procurement and supply for
these drugs alone. PEPFAR, for example, requires the US
Food and Drug Administration approval of ARVs instead
of the WHO prequalification commonly used by other
donors and countries [38]. It also specifies selected ARV
manufacturers and therefore constrains use of local ARV
production which Uganda started in 2008 [29]. Most
GHIs use the national governmental system for drug sto-
rage and distribution. NGOs funded by PEPFAR, however,
follow their own storage and distribution systems. Overall,
external support focuses on narrow, short-term and paral-
lel approaches. PEPFAR initiatives largely target the Non-
governmental and Faith-Based Organization sector with
only some indirect support to the MoH, mainly providing
training and laboratory equipment [36]. All GHIs support
warehouse capacity and short-term training. The Global
Fund has to some extent taken a more systems-based
approach by increasing human resource capacity through
the funding of procurement officers [32].
An initial policy intention existed to assimilate ARVs
with the essential drug supply system. Procurement was
meant to be aligned; ARVs were meant to be included in
the essential drug list; and a logistics management infor-
mation system (LMIS) for ARVs was intended to be put
in place [31]. However, as existing supply systems were
considered too weak to support the national ART pro-
gram, separate systems were set up with the objective to
integrate them later at an unspecified date [12]. Parallel
supply chains have gained additional leeway due to free
choice of private facilities to choose logistic providers
and similar options for public facilities sectors if the
NMS does not deliver. These parallel options were
Figure 2 Fluctuations of number of new patients on ART and their causes.
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justified on the grounds of a need to initially strengthen
the NMS [39]. A main initiative to support NMS’ capaci-
ties was the DELIVER project from 2001-2006. DELIVER
however at the end of the day also supported parallel
supply chain management systems of NGOs such as the
Joint Clinical Research Center (JCRC), a PEPFAR-funded
NGO which covered almost half of the patients on ARVs
in Uganda until it started to phase out in 2009. Another
policy intention to address inefficient ARV supply was
issued in 2008 when the government expressed a target
of reducing yearly expiration of unused drugs to a maxi-
mum of USD 1000 annually by, for example, denying
superfluous or non-aligned external funding as well as
improving the information system for drug supplies [35].
No progress on these initiatives was documented at the
time of this study
Governance
External actors very much shape current governance of
ARV supply chains. In Iganga District 15 NGOs were
found to work in the area of HIV; two of them being
directly involved in ART. Perceptions at district level are
that there is generally little cooperation between NGOs
themselves and the health district. Usually no joint plan-
ning efforts take place. District health managers often
lack information on projects and links of NGOs. At
national level, integrative efforts were already lacking
prior to ART as sector-wide planning in the health sector
only started in 1999. Surveys of the Country Coordina-
tion Mechanism (CCM) of the Global Fund, for example,
present a relatively large and inefficient committee,
whose role partly covers that of the Ugandan AIDS Com-
mission (UAC). PEPFAR has a policy to mainly support
NGOs, the majority of which are based in the capital
Kampala and relatively distant to district levels. In some
measure they were found to be part of the problems
related to poor accountability which lead to the tempor-
ary suspension of Global Fund grants in 2005 [40].
Poor accountability and mismanagement is another
governance issue for drug supply. At district level
Figure 3 Antiretroviral supply system in Uganda, 2010. IDI Infectious Diseases Institute. JCRC Joint Clinical Research Centre. JMS Joint
Medical Store. MRC Medical Research Council. MUJHU Makerere & John Hopkins University Research Collaboration. PIDC Paediatric Infectious
Diseases Clinic. TASO The AIDS Support Organisation. * Some NGOs also deliver to government health facilities.
Windisch et al. Globalization and Health 2011, 7:25
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/7/1/25
Page 5 of 11
funding for essential drugs is not always used according
to guidelines. Districts often do not include the pur-
chase of lab supplies in their budgets as required [31].
HCs are often not aware of how much funding for
drugs is credited to their accounts. In one district
almost half of the budget for essential drug purchase
was not utilized and two thirds of unused funds could
not be accounted for in the fiscal year (FY) 2004/05 and
2005/06. In the FY 2000/01 USD 1.75 million remained
unspent in district health accounts [34]. The average
leakage rate for drugs across ten public health facilities
in Uganda was estimated at 73%, with lowest availability
of high demand drugs, such as those to treat malaria
[41]. Some physicians are alleged to reroute essential
drugs to private clinics and pharmacies and then send
public patients to these outlets to purchase their medi-
cation. They may also under-procure drugs to cause a
shortage which is then covered by the private market.
Mechanisms to regulate are made dysfunctional as the
district planning teams responsible for monitoring are
sometimes involved in these diversions for private health
care [30].
Parallel to ART scale up an increasing number of
national frauds or mismanagements occurred. USD
190,300 earmarked for drugs was for example used for
travel abroad for government officials in 2006 [42]. In
another case three former health ministers and other
ministry staff were charged with alleged misappropria-
tion between 2006 and 2007 [43]. The Global Fund sus-
pension in 2005 resulted in some initiatives to correct
for non-compliance but disbursements did not resume
until 2008. That year encountered another case of poor
accountability resulting in a Global Fund disbursement
gap of USD 12 million [44]. The government mobilized
USD 30 million to fill the most severe shortfalls, but
could not completely avoid service delivery effects such
as stock-outs of antimalarials [45].
Financing
Bypassing, inadequate funding and dependency on
external donors were identified as main constraints to
better performance of the NMS [35]. Reimbursement
modalities were not defined when the NMS received the
logistics mandate for ARVs in 2003. The NMS usually
requires 6-10% ordered to cover storage, handling and
distribution. While programs usually pay 10%, MAP, for
example, only paid 6.5% arguing that the lower percen-
tage is justified given the high value of ARVs. Another
issue is that being a public agency, the NMS deals with
relatively long lead times in procurement, which is one
of the reasons why donors have opted for other pro-
curement channels [31].
External funding will continue to affect access to ART.
Funding for ART has increased considerably, but
remains unstable and unpredictable. Global Fund
moneys for HIV increased by 45% between 2004 and
2005 and then dropped by 18% following its temporary
suspension in 2005 [46]. PEPFAR’s share of HIV funding
in Uganda increased from 26% in 2003 to 85% in 2006
[16]. Predictions envisage decreasing funding due to
expressions of the US government to scale PEPFAR
down and hand over responsibilities to national govern-
ments [9].
Human Resources
National level data confirms a severe lack of human
resources in the area of supply chain management.
While the public sector in Uganda has about 350 quali-
fied pharmacists, it is estimated that at least 14,000 are
needed [29]. One of the reasons is a high turnover of
pharmacists, who go abroad or work in the private sec-
tor. A perception at national level is, for example, that
PEPFAR recipients have attracted the best health work-
ers from the government systems, especially doctors and
higher cadre nurses [40]. Salaries are much higher
within externally funded projects. Salaries of nurses and
doctors working for PEPFAR-funded programmes for
example are more than twice as high as those in the
public sector [40].
Information Systems
Figure 3 shows the number of supply chain management
programs and their information systems. Our Iganga Dis-
trict assessment revealed a range of parallel information
processes due to external initiatives. JCRC for example,
despite its policy to use Ministry of Health (MoH) forms,
was using separate forms. Obstacles resulted when
patients transferred to the public system in 2009. Different
coding systems and discontinued files also contributed to
misinterpretation of drug consumption rates needed to
inform the drug orders. Instructions on new patient files
and documentation remained poorly communicated to
succeeding programs. The Iganga surveys also showed
poor local compliance with information requirements.
Three out of five sites handled the filing of patient cards
poorly. Files were not kept in a way that allows easy retrie-
val and had to be sorted before assessment. The district as
a consequence misses the data needed for its supply fore-
casts, including numbers lost to follow-up.
National level surveys corroborate these findings. One
highlights a general lack of stationery, outdated forms,
superfluous and duplicated reporting requirements, inco-
herence in indicators as well as inconsistency between
systems that rely partly on computers, partly on manual
filing. Effects are weak processes, incomplete record, file-
keeping and reporting, the loss of data as it is being
aggregated from district to national level, and non-use of
composed information [32]. Another survey specifies
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weak inventory management of laboratory commodities,
half of the facilities did not use any report forms and
only about a quarter used stock cards [37]. Other
research shows distorting effects such as oversupply in
cases where MoH and PEPFAR-funded NGO projects
deliver drugs to the same facilities and patients [32].
The national policy in 2003 was to merge the HIS for
ART with the national LMIS: Logistic Management
Information System (LMIS) and the overall national
Health information system (HIS) [39]. A first barrier was
that national ART programs were at the outset based on
parallel LMISs. In 2004 three major systems existed: One
for the MoH free provision of ARVs and two for JCRC
that distinguished between free and sold ARVs. The
LMIS and HIS for essential medicines are yet not inte-
grated. One of the reasons is that clinical care and drug
logistics are managed by different committees that would
need to coordinate efforts [31]. This lack of well devel-
oped and integrated national HIS has triggered further
development of parallel HIS for ARVs [47]. The disad-
vantages of that trend were recognized, but perceived as
necessary to reduce the risks associated with the high
costs of ARVs. So far only a few isolated efforts to centra-
lize information on logistics have materialized, such as
incorporating ARV logistic forms into the national HIS
[12]. The need for an LMIS system covering all essential
drugs continues to be on the agenda but has not received
adequate funding and political support [31].
Service delivery
Stock outs at the point of service delivery are critical indi-
cators of poor quality services from the client perspective.
Not all stock outs are supply chain management related
per se. Previous sections covered these manifestations of
service delivery as they directly relate to supply chain man-
agement. Many other elements of service delivery may
result in lack of drugs and supplies which are not directly
related to supply chain management, including for exam-
ple adequacy of infrastructure and human resources in
general. Important shortages exist in areas such as labora-
tory equipment and reagents. A 2006 health facility survey
found most health facilities lack essential laboratory equip-
ment [34]. According to another survey only 17% of the
HC counselling rooms for HIV complied with national
guidelines. While all health centres providing PMTCT and
voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) have laboratories
for testing, technicians were not always available [14].
Condoms were the least available contraceptive assessed
during a health facility survey in 2006, resulting in a stag-
nating contraceptive coverage is stagnating at 23% [34].
Shortages were fuelled by a MoH policy to withdraw con-
doms from facility level in order to introduce quality
assurance for all incoming condoms which caused supply
disruptions for 1.5 years [48]. Between 2002 and 2006
family planning methods have only increased from 24% to
35% [34].
Discussion
Our assessment of the supply chain management at Iganga
District indicates important bottlenecks and system fail-
ures. We examine these through a systems thinking
approach linking dynamics and causes across different
sub-systems at district, national and international level.
Poor performance of supply chain management is being
reinforced by poor conditions at all levels of the health
system, including the areas of financing, governance,
human resources and information. Table 1 summarizes
the range of systems features as they relate to different
building blocks. Systems weaknesses are the main reasons
why - despite initial policy intentions to opt for integrated
approaches - parallel systems are being built that increase
complexity and trigger inefficiencies. Poor performance
results in less than satisfactory delivery not only for ART
but for health service delivery in general. Shortages are
particularly apparent for drugs and supplies other than
ARVs. In Iganga the supply of cotrimoxazole for example
by did not match by far the needs generated by ART
expansion. Essential drugs and supplies shortages also
show how, at a time of complex endeavors to deliver ART,
many other essential and more affordable and cost-effec-
tive health services still fall short of supply. Many higher
burden problems remain neglected by GHIs such as child-
hood pneumonia and maternal mortality which appear to
be particularly affected by relatively little attention and
funding [49,50].
Findings from other countries substantiate the trends
seen in this research. A study in six Sub-Saharan African
countries shows that counterfeits and sub-standard drugs
are becoming commonplace [51]. Surveys on health sys-
tem effects of disease-specific programs unanimously
report adverse effects in the area of governance with paral-
lel bureaucracies, a general lack of aid coordination and
integration to national systems [7,15,17,52-62]. Common
themes related to supply chain management include
donor driven priorities and systems, unwieldy procedures,
uncoordinated practices, negotiations with different
donors, excessive demands on time, different funding
mechanisms and reporting expectations as well as delays
in disbursements [63-65]. In Malawi procurement guide-
lines of the World Bank were used despite being perceived
as cumbersome [66]. In Benin and other countries little
attention has been paid in strengthening government pro-
curement capacities [56].
Governance of drug supply chains appears as a key
driver of systems performance. This research highlights
important gaps between stated intentions, policies and
implementation. Figure 4 illustrates the dynamic rela-
tionships between external inputs, intended and
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unintended actions at different dimensions of the health
system as conceptualized by systems thinking [23].
External actors follow their own agendas, set up parallel
processes and follow short-term approaches. External
initiatives focus on “easy” bottlenecks, such as clinical
knowledge and warehouse capacity and avoid the more
complex issues of systems strengthening [67]. As a MAP
official put it: “We somehow strengthened the supply
chain but it was temporary; no efforts continued after
the project closed” [32]. Exceptions such as the
DELIVER project exist but remain inhibited by system
constraints. Government lacks administrative capacities,
regulatory structures, information and incentives needed
to monitor and ensure quality standards. These system
constraints constitute common weaknesses in low-
income countries [68,69]. Poor accountability affects
external funding and consequently reliable drug supply.
A vicious spiral emerges when bypassing weak systems
with parallel systems causing further weakening causes
of the primary system.
Table 1 System effects of ART expansion in Uganda
System Outcomes Description of System Causes and Effects Primary Sub-system affected
More people on ART The country has rapidly expanded ART with a 50% coverage of those in
need by the end of 2009. Effects include creation of demands that
require the systems to sustain an appropriate level of care.
Service delivery, with knock-on
effects on all other sub-systems
Supply shortages (essential drugs)
and expiry (ARVs)
Little investments in strengthening supply systems for essential drugs,
lack of qualified staff leading. Effects include poor health outcomes,
inefficiencies, financial and credibility losses.
Technologies, with knock-on
effects on all other sub-systems
New supply chain management
systems and governance structures
for ART
Interest for short-term targets easier achieved through parallel systems.
New structures and interests difficult to readjust later on. Effects include
poor outcomes, vicious circles between weak systems and vertical
approaches.
Governance, Technologies,
Information, as well as the other
sub-systems
ART program related
mismanagement
Partly due to lack of absorptive capacity for rapid and large funding.
Effects include misappropriation, withdrawal of funding, inefficiencies.
Governance, with knock-on effects
on all other sub-systems
Brain drain, lack of qualified and
motivated staff
Focus on short-term trainings, lack of training, higher salaries and other
incentives within disease-specific programs compared to the public
sector
Human Resources, knock-on effects
on all sub-systems
Lack of appropriate data Parallel, partly inefficient as well as unfeasible programme specific
information systems. Effects include failure to focus on one national
information system that meets quality standards, inefficiencies,
superfluous tasks at facility level.
Information, knock-on effects on all
sub-systems
Figure 4 System dynamics of supply chain management for ART.
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Despite the intention to integrate ARV supply chains
with essential drug systems at a later stage, five years
into ART such efforts have not matured. This confirms
the general axiom that approaches initially designed as
disease and program-specific are not easily joined into
sector-wide systems [70]. Systems issues rooted in weak
governance and disconnected processes are difficult to
remedy. Given the nature of reinforcing effects, the
dynamics that create adverse effects will accelerate as
scale-up, the number of disease-specific interventions,
structures and external actors increase. Moreover, new
systems become resistant to change as actors develop
competing interests, such as remaining employed by
new programs. Dynamics thus need to be anticipated
and mitigated at early stages. Systems thinking is a way
to account for multiple, reinforcing and unpredicted
ways in which ART supply chains interact with other
health system components. As highlighted by WHO, “a
system’s failure requires a system’s solution - not a tem-
porary remedy” [71]. At the moment, the term “system
strengthening” is being largely misused for interventions
that continue to have fragmenting effects. Crucially, sys-
tems approaches need to tackle the diverse bottlenecks
this study has described across building blocks. Impor-
tant elements include better integration of donors with
national structures, long term sustainable funding or
improving links between different elements of the health
system through regulatory and appropriate feedback
systems.
Countries themselves so far have made little use of
available funding for health system strengthening [72].
One reason is likely a lack of capacities to develop
health system programs with more complex designs as
compared to disease-specific interventions. Systems
thinking helps countries to assess and appreciate the
system effects of interventions and adapt plans accord-
ingly. It helps identify synergistic effects of multiple
interventions across the majority of the health system
building blocks, with attention to system based monitor-
ing and careful steering of dynamic and interrelated pro-
cesses. National ownership that allows for continuous
follow-up and adaptation as well as the rooting of
responses within national institutions therefore constitu-
tes a vital part of any external support.
Conclusions
This study presents a synthesis of the current way of
managing ARV supply in Uganda. It uses the vantage
point of a systems thinking lens and a research project
which investigates front line provider realities and links
them to national developments. It does this through clo-
sely examining systems prerequisites in the area of gov-
ernance, financing, human resource, information and
service delivery in general. Its findings identify serious
system failures, and dangerous and potentially irreversi-
ble dynamics due to the flourishing of disease-specific-
intervention and their general focus on short term
targets and failure to address current systems bottle-
necks. Results are unsatisfactory outcomes not only for
HIV but for health in general. The opportunity and
need to use ART investments for an essential supply
chain management has not been exploited. External aid
approaches fail to sustainably strengthen health systems
and national responses to disease-specific programs.
Shifting to a deeper understanding through systems
thinking to shape and continuously follow up interven-
tions that bear potential for system-wide improvements
will give better insights to strengthen systems. Key
approaches such as long-term funding and targets,
evidence-based priority setting and national ownership
are largely known. What appears to be missing is the
sense of exigency and awareness regarding the risks of
not only poor outcomes but system distortions and their
hindrance to sustainable progress.
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